20c APRIL 27, 1953

ADLAI AND THE WHIRLWIND IN MANILA

New Republic

EISENHOWER'S PEACE PROGRAM

ITS GREATNESS AND WEAKNESS

Is this the way to reach the Russians?

Does the President speak for his party?

A TRUCE IS NO ANSWER IN KOREA

by Tom Fitzsimmons

THE CHALLENGE OF THE CHRISTIAN ENIGMA

A Letter by Dr. C. G. Jung

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APR 25 1953

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From Our Readers

Too Erudite?

● When I read the letter from Evelyn Schloss in the April 13 issue, complaining that the *New Republic* is too erudite, I sat down and wrote this reply:

I am taking the liberty of writing a friendly reply to your letter . . . because it seems to me that you have entirely mistaken the fundamental purpose that is back of the publishing of this fine magazine. I have taken *NR* for almost 40 years, and during this time I have often disagreed with some of the editorials, articles or reviews, but almost always what I read made me think, therefore I feel that this magazine has had a greater influence upon my life than any other periodical.

Of course many people don't want to think—it makes them uncomfortable; so they read such magazines as *Collier's*, *Saturday Evening Post*, *Life* or even the various movie magazines with their glamorous pictures. Such people look at the pictures and the wonderful advertisements, perhaps they read a story or two to help them pass the time on a rainy day, and some of them even wade through an occasional article. I do not condemn any of this, but I think of these other magazines as being in an entirely different class from *NR*. They are intended to help you relax and pass the time; but *NR* intends to make you think. I was a teacher for many years, and although I recognize the need for "the tools of learning" and even for a certain amount of factual information, I always believed that the basic purpose of education was to make people think. So I regard *NR* as a sort of educational magazine, and because many people don't want to be educated, I believe *NR* will always have a fairly small circulation. People who want to know what is going on in the world read at least the headlines of newspapers, and I certainly do not scorn such wonderful periodicals as the New York *Times* and the *Christian Science Monitor*—to name only two out of many. Some of these people even read the editorials in such newspapers, and either agree or disagree with what the editors write, often depending on the "politics" of the paper. If they want a summary of what has happened during the week they go through some such magazine as *Newsweek* and I certainly don't scorn that for I do it myself. But if you really want to size up the principal things that are going on in the world, think about them, try to decide how you yourself feel about them, then I believe such a magazine as *New Republic* is invaluable.

I admit that *NR* has not always maintained its high standard. During certain periods I have felt it to be rather dull; and during other periods I have thought it too biased in expressing its political opinions. At one time it got to be so "leftish" that I was alarmed for its safety; and many times I have disagreed violently with what I read. *But always it has made me think*, and therefore I am grateful to have had this on-the-whole-very-fine magazine coming into my home so regularly every week.

Perhaps I should add in closing that I am in no way connected with *NR*, either financially, politically or otherwise. I am simply an older person who thinks that real democracy must be founded on intelligent, friendly, co-operative citizens; and I am writing you this friendly letter because I hope you are an open-minded person who will try at least several more issues of a periodical which might actually come to have quite an influence in your life.

KARL WILSON GEHRKENS,
Professor Emeritus, Oberlin College
Elk Rapids, Mich.

● I fully agree with Reader Evelyn Schloss, (*NR*, April 13) that most articles are windy, repetitious, erudite—and let me add, pretentious. Indeed, now that Percy Winner is no longer with you, my only reason for continuing is consideration for my newsdealer.

Brooklyn, N. Y. MARTIN CHRISTIANSEN

Correction

● Before somebody else does so, may I correct my statement in "Who Owned the Ocean in 1776?" (*NR*, April 13) that Samuel Livermore resigned from Congress to become a judge of the Court of Appeals in Cases of Capture. To make him eligible for that position, his election was postponed two weeks to let his Congressional term expire, but he was re-elected to Congress without his knowledge and remained ineligible. He then resigned to become judge of the New Hampshire Superior Court. Livermore, who held in Congress that federal maritime jurisdiction extended to the high-tide mark, had been a judge advocate of the admiralty for five years in colonial New Hampshire.

Washington, D. C. IRVING BRANT

Stevenson and the GOP

● In reply to Mr. Alphonsus J. Murphy's ("Letters," March 30) charge of Stevenson's softness toward Republicans, let us remember that the article in question could not have been written more than several weeks after the Inauguration. It's still time for a change, but not even the most eloquent can do much to hurry it up.

(Continued on page 4)

To Our Readers

● Our readers are leaders and they respond to the challenge we present. Each morning the mailman unburdens a new load of letters, many so impatient that they all but spring out of their envelopes. Only 36,000 readers! Why the *NR* ought to have 300,000, three million readers, the writers exclaim. Go to slick paper! Print in four colors! Put the *NR* in every drug store! Become a mass magazine.

That raises the whole concept of editorial approach and appeal.

We take no pride in being small, even though we decline to join the cult of size worshippers. We need a hundred thousand readers and we intend to get them—but not by writing down to them. We suspect the greedy slogan—*we aim to please.* We tire of talk about putting the same soap in a new package. We sense that there are many forms of intimidation, and that intimidation by the readers can be as oppressive as that of the advertisers.

We aim to please, but only those whose pleasure lies in the joys of an open mind. We couldn't respect our readers or ourselves if we said before publishing our opinions—*will anyone object?* We doubt if the desire to be popular is responsible for many of the world's advances. In any case, we are not obsessed by it, beyond the point of reaching self-sufficiency! We stand apart from the mass production of ideas. We are not slaves to headlines or publishers' print orders. Even on important developments we like to hold forth only if we feel we have something original to say. On the day on which we have nothing original and challenging to say, we hope we will have the courage to cease publication. For though we happen to be non-conformists, non-conformity is not enough. We fear the one-party press because it stands for stereotyped thinking. We fear the two-party press for the same reason. We would fear the liberal press once liberalism comes to mean a predictable reaction to all events, and a set of fixed ideas that were daring 40 years ago.

That is our editorial approach. We try to set the highest standards, even if we rarely succeed. Perhaps there are a hundred thousand who value our opinions—perhaps there are more. We shall succeed if that many feel, not that they are duty bound to read us, but that life would be poorer if it were not for those few pages every week.

That brings up the next question so baffling to impatient readers—why we look as we do. Next week I'll try to explain.

M. S.

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New Republic

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WASHINGTON WIRE

FOREIGN NEWS can go into a capsule again this week. Everything still hangs on what's going on in the Kremlin, and what that is nobody knows. There is, however, an increasing tendency here to believe a quiet, lethal power-struggle may be underway between Premier Malenkov and Interior Minister Beria. There can only be one Queen in the despotism of the Soviet hive. Eisenhower, meanwhile, did a good job in his speech putting Cold War responsibility on Moscow; it was a fairly obvious speech, but he gave it strength and conviction. His cabinet is now following up with continuing speeches. Judging by the first of these, by Dulles, they will be half political, claiming all credit for Korean truce moves for the new Administration. Before Republicans are through they will probably claim the GOP 1952 victory killed Stalin. As for Ike's eloquent pledge to use a saving on arms for world aid—can we believe that? Perhaps our patriotic duty is to hide our beliefs; by an unfortunate coincidence Dulles has just told Congress he wants to end government Point Four aid as soon as possible. Post-Cold War world aid—huh!



McCarthy has not been weakened by recent Senate events; he has been strengthened. Optimistic columnists were wrong. Once again the unfailing tendency to underestimate McCarthy has proved false. Let's take another look at the situation. What causes McCarthy? He's the outgrowth of a basic feeling of American insecurity; McCarthyism is rooted in national fear. Why is there this fear? Because for the first time in history America is directly and intimately challenged by a force potentially as strong as its own; European nations have had this experience for centuries; it's brand new to the US. McCarthy is aided by a second fact, a basic element in the American political structure. America does not have and never has had, responsible parties in the parliamentary sense. In Britain, Labourites or Conservatives would discipline McCarthy; in Washington each party has a vested interest in him. Democrats fear him but also rejoice at the way he's embarrassing the Administration. Republicans fear but use him. Ike is irresolute, and Taft has privately declared he's "the biggest asset the GOP has." (As we said last week, he'll be used in an attempt to destroy liberal Democratic Senators in 1954.) What does McCarthy want? Power. Power and more power. We believe he wants to be President. Is this as silly as it sounds? If there is no great cataclysm, depression, or wartime setback, we believe American institutions can handle McCarthy. But in all solemnity we add these thoughts: (a) McCarthy has been constantly underestimated; (b) for the first time the ultra-right wing, Fascist and crack-pot minorities are united behind one man (with Colonel McCormick demanding a new party); (c) for the first time a national political figure has arisen in America with a following so fanatical that the question of his veracity is of secondary importance to it; (d) this leader's ambition is limitless and (e) the nation is engaged in a power struggle during which sudden emotional storms are always possible.

Democratic Senators twit Ike for not having sent much of any program up to Congress yet. This is true, but it ignores the other fact that in the first 90 days a huge GOP demolition job has started, a job that only partially needs new legislation and that is designed in the interests of the Haves as against the Have-nots. Let's list a few items in what is really a notable start. In a series of key appointments Ike is turning the independent police commissions — Federal Trade, Tariff, Housing and the like—over to big business. Simultaneously his

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Cabinet members are firing civil-service officials in pro-consumer and other agencies: Director Day of the US Fish & Wildlife Service is an example. Dr. Astin of the Bureau of Standards (whose firing was later delayed by popular protest) is another. Federal synthetic rubber factories will be sold to private industry; the RFC which made loans to small business, and similar agencies will be abolished. In Congress the big drive is to give away multi-billion dollar offshore oil, with other great national resources waiting in line for plunder. Stand-by industrial economic controls are specifically opposed by the White House. Antitrust proceedings against big oil companies are being modified or dropped; the remnants of the great public-housing project which Truman proposed are being thrown out; such odds and ends as the inland waterway barge line, public-power installations, federal home mortgages worth a billion dollars are in process of being auctioned off to private bidders; atomic energy will be handed over to business as soon as taxpayers' money has definitely taken the risk out of it. In Congress, special interests that Ike put in power are blocking his proposal to extend social security, are fighting his effort to cut tariffs, and are getting ready to whoop through a tax cut bonanza for big business. As Mrs. Roosevelt says, "The present Administration is inclining more and more toward the interests of big business, big farmers, big cattlemen and big power companies and less and less in the interests of the individual consumer, the small businessman, small farmer and small cattleman." In short, it has *not* been a do-nothing 90 days; rarely has an Administration started paying off election promises so rapidly.

Notes: Whatever Ike does about a balanced budget the movement in Congress for a tax cut is now irresistible. . . . The day Dulles in a speech here told State Department career men he would protect them, career diplomat John P. Davies, a McCarthy target, frequently cleared by loyalty boards, was ordered out of Germany to exile in Peru. *Washington* T.R.B.

LETTERS

(Continued from page 2)

Actually, it seems highly improbable that the inescapable implications of the Administration's actions, which have been giving us all the horrors, can have escaped the politically acute Mr. Stevenson.

As to the future, a rereading of Stevenson's Cleveland speech (Oct. 23, '52) should restore some confidence in our spokesman's fighting ability. There seems to be some question about ammunition shortages in Washington these days, but I doubt that Mr. Stevenson will be caught short-handed when he resumes our fight for the welfare of the nation as a whole. *Madison, Wis.* MARJORIE A. CRON

Big vs. Little Steal

● What an inspired genius as a propagandist was the late Adolf Hitler when he wrote the now classic statement in public relations about the Big Lie and the Petty Lie! See W. H. Lawrence's statement in the New York *Times* of March 5 as to the causes of the Democratic defeat last year. Here we have the Big Steal—the oil lands, the mineral lands, the grazing lands, the public power projects etc. etc.—worth billions—versus "The Petty" or "Little Steal" of mink coats. Why not turn over all governmental powers—defense—foreign relations—to private interests. Or, haven't we done this already. Has taxation been overlooked? How about farming out the taxes as in the good old days of Sulla, Herod and Louis XI? *Montreal, Que.* EMILE PICARD

Bandwagon

A Little Privacy, Please!

"I also want to travel," [Anne Baxter] said. . . . "I've never been to Europe. I'd like to go as a nonentity, in a costume. I'd like to dress as a Hindu in a turban with a pearl in my forehead." – *From a UP dispatch.*

That Explains It

The cross-country check turns up evidence that debt delinquencies aren't by any means limited to the lowest economic brackets.

A San Francisco banker says that used Cadillacs account for a surprisingly large share of the slow payments and defaults on his books. Of course, used Cadillacs have sometimes been sold on a no-down-payment basis to folks in low-income brackets, too. – *From the* Wall Street Journal.

Accentuate the Negative?

The most positive thing about the Eisenhower Administration, after two months in office, may seem to be its negativism. But its largely negative approach is calculated to produce positive results. – *From the* Wall Street Journal.

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New Republic

EISENHOWER'S SPEECH — THE GREATNESS AND WEAKNESS

PRESIDENT EISENHOWER'S SPEECH to the newspaper editors might have been delivered by Henry Wallace or by Dean Acheson. That is its greatness, and also its weakness.

The greatness of the speech lies in Eisenhower's assumption of world leadership—the one unique and sound reason for his Presidency. He commits this nation, as Wallace, Acheson, Truman and Stevenson could not, to the responsibilities and the restraints which offer our best hope for peace.

In this speech the combination of arrogance and isolationism which dominated Republican attitudes in opposition is absent. The leader of the party whose right-wing equated negotiation and appeasement, moderation and subversion lays aside the flaming promises of "liberation" and *Life's* insistence that peace lies beyond the annihilation of the Soviet state. He declares that it is the imperial expansion of Soviet Communism and not its internal order that threatens war. He calls for the withdrawal of Soviet forces to their legitimate frontiers, not for the destruction of the Soviet regime. He insists that no issue between the free world and the Soviet world is insoluble. He calls for a peace that is "neither partial nor punitive," and fortified "not by weapons of war but by wheat and by cotton; by milk and by wool; by meat and timber and rice."

This general approach should mark the transition of a major party from irresponsible opposition to acceptance of national responsibility. But does it? The Russians—and others—will ask: Is Eisenhower really speaking for his party in Congress, in the press, throughout the nation? He calls on the Russians for deeds, not words. But can he advance his own peace program from words to deeds?

The new Administration has no plans to support Eisenhower's offers on Korea and Indo-China. The Pentagon would explode if the Russians should indicate acceptance of Eisenhower's proposal to return to world control of atomic energy and all armaments. The Congress has no intention of lowering tariff barriers to move the wool and the timber, the cotton and the meat on which the world's peace is to be fortified.

Eisenhower calls for deeds, not words. But what is the world to conclude when in the same week in which Eisenhower stated: "We are prepared to reaffirm with the most concrete evidence our readiness to help build a world in which all peoples can be productive and prosperous" he turns down the low bid from Britain for electrical equipment, in support of the Buy American Act?

Eisenhower's Administration promises world prosperity but foresees at best the extension of the feeble trade agreements program. It calls on the Russians to recognize human dignity in all lands, but acts to abandon the Covenant of Human Rights. It seeks to lift the Iron Curtain at Leningrad, but leaves lowered the bars at Ellis Island. While it holds forth the promise of Point Four in happier days, it moves to kill Point Four, now when it counts most.

Eisenhower's speech is important, because his views carry in the government as Truman's never did. Yet the majority of his appointments are of men to whom the philosophy of the April 16 speech is repugnant. Eisenhower's victory over Russian extremism is foreseen in the speech; his battle with Republican extremism has yet to be acknowledged. The speech is regarded as a challenge to the Russians; it is in fact a challenge to the United States.

II.

The greatness of the speech is the challenge; its weakness is that the challenge is presented in the framework of the Crusade. For the Crusade marches in the moral realm which Wallace and Acheson shared: the world of good and bad faith; the struggle of right and wrong followed by the conversion; the agreement to be friends; the vision of living happily ever after as crusaders and infidels unite to do good works. There is no such world, and if there is to be peace, it will draw nearer by smaller and less dramatic steps.

Eisenhower is elected to represent America's national interest—an attitude shaped by our geography and economy, our culture and our faith. It is a fair assumption that the Soviet leaders regard themselves as the responsible defenders of Russia's national interest, dominated far more than we like to assume by the same historical forces. Russia's national interest differs from ours and will continue to differ. Now, as always, the aim of diplomacy is to bring the formal attributes of

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sovereignty into accord with the realities of power and the accepted concepts of justice, and to resolve without the tensions caused by change.

Between the free world and the Soviet world there are deep ideological divisions. But they are not the root cause of the conflicts of the postwar years which have been crystallized and perhaps prolonged by the term *Cold War*. In prewar years the Russians prepared to accelerate and take advantage of the breakdown they regarded as inevitable in other societies. Their efforts caused only marginal conflicts until the war. Then the suicidal aggressiveness of Germany and Japan and the bankruptcy of the Nationalist regime in China opened up huge areas that invited intervention. So the Russians intervened, and so we checked them. The check was limited but violent. It leaves like a scar the suspicion that there is no basis of compromise with the Russians because what is right for them is thereby wrong for us. That leaves a world of tremendous tensions; of apocalyptic wars or sweeping change followed by a wholly altered time. That is the world of Eisenhower's speech. And yet the truth is that tensions will be lowered not by grandiose settlements but by unpretentious and continuous accommodations. For there are times when it is mutually advantageous for adversaries to reach agreement, even if the agreements are in the nature of bets on the final outcome of the contest.

If accommodations are reached, that does not mean that trickery is ended. Always and naturally the Soviet leaders will act in good faith and in bad faith, honoring agreements which are realistic and hitting whenever we are stupid enough to leave ourselves open to the punch. We are now like two wrestlers locked in a body scissor and a toe hold. One, to make the fight more flexible, moves to disengage. That doesn't mean that he kneels to kiss his adversary, nor that, if given the opportunity, he will not thrust a knee in his opponent's groin. But because one wrestler moves to disengage, the other does not conclude that the deadlock must be maintained.

The Soviet regime is overextended and beset by internal disputes. For this reason the Soviet leaders may have concluded that it is in their interests to settle for a truce in Korea and even to seek agreement in Germany or Austria. These agreements alone would not lead to disarmament; every loophole in every treaty would be exploited against us; the agreements would continue only as long as they reflect the balance of power. And yet they would be useful in reducing tensions.

The conflicts concerning Germany and Japan (of which Korea is a reflection) are military and territorial. For that reason they are, in theory, subject to practical accommodations. But the accommodations will not be concluded by the Soviet leaders at Russia's sole expense.

Yet that is what President Eisenhower, when he moves from his general approach to his varied proposals, is asking.

In Korea, Eisenhower proposes free elections for a unified Korea. Apart from the unreality of free elections in a shattered nation, his proposal amounts to a call for surrender which the Chinese and Russians are not likely to accept. Korea is the military highway to China, and its northern border is a sensitive Soviet frontier. Japan discovered that she could influence only as much of the mainland as she was ready to occupy with her own armies. We plan to withdraw and yet retain, in the free world, territory we have not been able to gain in the Korean War.

In Eastern Europe, Eisenhower proposes to put democracy and Communism on open trial in free elections. Following the victory of strongly anti-Soviet emigre groups at the polls, so we assume, the Russians are to put their tails between their legs and retire to lick their wounds. When they can be driven in this manner from Warsaw, they can be driven from Moscow as well.

In Germany Eisenhower proposes free elections to bring into being a united and sovereign Germany. The new Germany will then be free to join a military alliance led by the United States. There is no indication that if Soviet troops should retire to their own frontiers US troops would also withdraw. What incentive then is there for the Russians to conclude these accommodations? While Eisenhower rejects unconditional surrender as a general war aim, he is in fact demanding unconditional surrender in Korea, Eastern Europe and Germany, and without a military victory.

And Eisenhower knows this! Yet, he cannot offer compromises because the speech is directed to America as well as to Russia and his own party in America would repudiate him. He cannot indicate that NATO is ultimately expendable, and that American troops must some day retire from continental Europe, because to do so now would bring Europe's rearmament to a halt and might send her governments in panic to the Russian side.

Eisenhower has rightly committed our government to a limited objective—the withdrawal of the Russian armies behind Russia's frontiers. It will never be obtained by screaming headlines and overdramatized elections. To the Soviet leaders, this kind of setback would be worse than war. The only possible method of achieving Eisenhower's objective is to make the reduction in Russia's political influence in Eastern Europe as gradual, as

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unobtrusive, as devoid of outward triumphs as possible.

To pursue this patient and quiet course is difficult for any Administration. But it is possible for Eisenhower given his widespread support. It will not leave the Soviet leaders wondering which of his paragraphs are aimed at them and which at his fellow Republicans or domestic minority groups. It will help to convince our allies that this nation can fulfill its world responsibilities without the nervous compulsions aroused by alternatives of a new Garden of Eden or catacylsmic war.

ULTIMATUM vs. NEGOTIATION

by Samuel L. Sharp

THE ENTHUSIASTIC reaction to President Eisenhower's foreign-policy speech is an indication of the craving felt this side of the Iron Curtain for a coherent formulation of the attitude to be adopted toward the current peace overtures of the Kremlin. It has been clear for some weeks now that the "offensive" could not be simply shrugged off or dismissed with some obvious quips about the loaded dove of peace. Nor was it enough to sound the usual warnings. An answer had to be given, and the world quite naturally looked to the United States to set the tone.

But when the enthusiasm, generated at least in part by the felicitous phrasing of the speech, has worn off, it will be subjected, in the Kremlin and elsewhere, for indications of a practical policy. In this respect the document may be found to be somewhat disappointing.

From the point of view of the student of international politics, the main contribution of the speech lies in certain things that it does *not* contain. There is no longer the bland assertion of the Inaugural Address that the current conflict is one between "darkness and light." Such a conflict is of an elemental nature and does not lend itself to compromise. Yet compromise is the very essence of diplomacy, that much maligned tool of international politics, for which more glittering substitutes have frequently been suggested but none more effective actually invented.

For once we were told by the President that none of the issues at present separating the Soviet Union from the free world is insoluble. Another valuable point is the changed diagnosis of the origins of the present crisis. For once references to the ultimate aims of the Soviet leaders to "dominate the whole world" are omitted. The responsibility for tension is still charged entirely to the Soviet Union, but it is explained as being the result of fear, exaggerated notions of security and an unfortunate choice of means to make the Soviet Union secure.

This shift of emphasis in the diagnosis is in itself desirable as conducive to the proper frame of mind for negotiation. You cannot negotiate with fanatics bent on dominating the world at any price and under any circumstances. But you can try to persuade people beset by anxieties that the causes of their fears are non-existent.

In his insistence on reassuring the Soviet leaders that the outside world "has never had any aggressive purpose whatsoever," the President has echoed a line of argument persistently used by Dean Acheson as Secretary of State. This is an obvious line to take, but one that fails to take into account what the British historian H. H. Butterfield calls the *tragic* element of modern international relations. It is not enough for you to believe, and quite sincerely, that you mean "him" no harm; the fear may still be there. President Eisenhower understands, and he said so in his speech, that acts "carry a power of persuasion not to be matched by any amount of oratory." His reassuring statement, valuable in itself, cannot be expected to work magic.

There is, in the President's speech, a somewhat disturbing lack of precision with respect to what the United States is prepared to do in order to "assume its just part" in improving the international situation. While the Soviet leaders are asked to provide a concrete answer—and by deeds, not mere words—to more than half a dozen specific questions, the United States concretely offers only to devote part of the savings to be obtained from the reduction of armaments to constructive purposes. As a "psychological warfare" gesture it is probably very satisfactory. The image of substantial sums, voted by a generous and openminded Congress, for roads, hospitals and other useful things designed to meet concrete human needs, is no doubt more appealing than the bleak prospects of still more guns and still less butter traditionally held out by the Soviet leaders (with a vague promise of the millenium dangled before the eyes of the toilers without much conviction). But is this psychological victory all we are out to achieve? The notions of success entertained by the "sykewar" boys are very limited indeed. When you have won a victory in this battle of words, where are you?

Apart from the promise of channeling resources made available by the reduction of armaments, the United States is willing to accept peace on its known and often

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repeated terms. The Russians are expected, as an earnest of their will to ease tension, to bring about a truce in Korea and an end to the state of semi-war elsewhere in Asia. This demand is based on the assumption that the Kremlin can with some simple push-button action call off the Chinese battalions just as it allegedly could with one simple order send them into battle. This assumption is in itself not definitely proven; by ignoring the Chinese Communists, we pay the Russians a dubious compliment concerning their decisive influence in the Communist world and possibly ask them to perform something that they are not necessarily in a position to do.

The Soviet leaders are then asked to agree to free elections not only in a unified (and presumably evacuated) Germany, but also in the so-called satellite countries of Eastern Europe. When considered in the light of the principle that each nation should be independent, this sounds like a very reasonable suggestion, but it is again one that lightheartedly overlooks some of the less noble but basic facts of international life. The image of a world of free nations, with big and small happily basking in the sun of liberty, is beautiful but not easily translatable into reality. To the Soviet leaders, the President's suggestion, formulated in politically meaningful terms, means simply that we want the Soviet Union to relinquish control over Eastern Europe. This point, in the opinion of many dispassionate students of the problem, is not very fortunately chosen as a test of the peaceful intentions of the Soviet Union. Stalin made this clear to Harry Hopkins in the Spring of 1945, when Hopkins tried to argue that the treatment accorded to Poland by the Soviet Union, "though unimportant *per se*" was looked upon in America as an indication of Stalin's general intentions. There is—or, at least, there ought to be—in the foreign policy of every nation, a list of aims, arranged in the order of their importance and classed roughly in three groups: vital aims, desirable but secondary aims, and aims that are merely "a fine thing" but which the given nation is not prepared to insist on. In the opinion of many students of Russia, the "satellite" area, or most of it, is considered by Russia —*any* Russia free to express her will—an area of vital concern. This is not the case with Germany. One may therefore expect to negotiate the Russians out of Germany, under certain conditions, but not, for instance, out of Poland. As Professor Max Beloff, an eminent specialist on Soviet foreign policy, once pointed out, our ability to get the Russians out of Poland short of war would indicate that we can do "much more." Perhaps the President has some information, unknown to the public, that would indicate that the Soviet leaders are in such a state of panic or despair that they are willing to make peace at almost any price, possibly the price of sheer survival. But if such information is not available, one must be prepared to see the Soviet Union unwilling to give a simple "yes or no" answer to the questions put to her leaders by the President.

A proper evaluation of the Eisenhower speech depends on whether it is to be considered as a statement of our *final* stand or merely as one of our *initial* position. If the former is the case, the otherwise admirable document must be said to suffer from a certain rigidity of approach which all noble wordage can scarcely remove. If the latter, more specific statements may be necessary, not only to remove the impression that we are essentially talking what Walter Lippmann has called "unconditional surrender language," but also to drive home to the American people the basic fact of international politics that national aims must be arranged like a shopping list with some items omitted when not available or too expensive.

The Return of the Republicans

Sixteen million people voted Republican last November. What did they vote for? They voted to give a small group of men the power to govern this country for four years.

While the return of the Republicans means the return of a certain group of politicians, these men have certain ideas and certain connections which will determine their attitude to public affairs. Their opinions were formed in their youth. Consequently they believe that this country was built up by the aggressive, irresistible captains of industry, free from interference at home, and protected against competition from abroad. They have changed none of their ideas on the exploitation of natural resources. Though the halcyon days are over in which forests and mines seemed inexhaustible, though the time is at hand when natural capital must be carefully conserved, they believe to the very limit of what the public will tolerate, in the allocation to private hands of what remains in the public domain, and the unregulated uses of all natural resources.

America is to be governed by men inexperienced in the modern world, but over-experienced in the one that has passed away. – *New Republic*, March 9, 1921

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ECONOMIC NATIONALISM — MOSCOW'S NEW SLOGAN

THE ARRIVAL of Maurice Thorez in France after two years in Russia seemed more like a retreat from Moscow than a triumphal return to Paris. First news of his actual departure from Moscow was published in the *Figaro* and other anti-Communist newspapers a full day before the *Humanité* could give the news to the faithful.

Dozens of France's leading Communists and many hundreds of trained specialists in the technique of the so-called spontaneous demonstration were waiting with flowers and flags at the Paris railroad station. This time, they assumed, there could be no mistake. The car in which Thorez was traveling had been reported en route from a number of places in Germany. It was a luxurious special car of the Polish State Railroad.

The train carrying Thorez's special car arrived. But he was not on board. And apparently not one of the officials waiting had been informed in advance that Thorez would leave the train at a suburban way station and take a rest—obviously a euphemism for slinking into hiding. The impression of trouble between the new Moscow team and the old Paris team seemed confirmed by the fact that the Moscow newspapers gave only a barren few lines to the news of Thorez's return home.

Nevertheless, within a few days of Thorez's arrival a new poster appeared. In bright color it showed Marianne-La France waving the red, white and blue flag of the Republic, with the slogan "Independence, Bread, Freedoms, Peace."

Along with many other signs, the poster seems to confirm that the key word of Malenkov's new propaganda directives for the Communist parties of Western Europe and Southern Asia is not peace, but independence. It amounts to a call in Europe for political independence of France, Italy and the other nations from US influence, and from the obligations of participation in US-sponsored patterns of Atlantic and/or European unification. In Asia the emphasis is on a species of economic neutralism, against the pressures of the US to cut off trade with Mao Tse-tung's China. But both in Europe and Asia, the economic and the political factors are interrelated in terms of a slogan intended to fit the needs of the next phase in the Cold War.

Malenkov himself takes care of the stepped-up peace offensive. Beria makes the bids on the plane of freedoms. But peace and freedoms (in the plural, as stated in the formula brought back from Moscow) come after the other two key words—independence and bread.

At first glance, the emphasis on independence may seem nothing more than a continuation of the efforts to split the Western Europeans and Southern Asiatics away from the US. The difference is that the appeal now is specifically national, rather than to groups or combinations of nations. In France, for example, the argument goes beyond the issue of ratification of the EDC: it is that French independence, if not survival as a nation, is threatened by US favoritism to the rise of Germany as an economic, even more than as a military, power. And whatever the French Government may say or believe, the French people are more worried about German aggrandizement in Europe than about Red Chinese aggression in the Viet-Nam.

In Great Britain, the argument is that the country's difficult task of keeping its economic head above water is complicated by what the London *Times* calls, in connection with the US-dictated wheat agreement, "the intrusion of American domestic policy into international trade." The British are afraid of the possible effect on them of the economic "readjustment" which is expected in the US unless Washington changes her domestic policy. The *Economist*, the most authoritative economic journal in the British Commonwealth, recently published a careful 12-page long analysis of US prospects, coming to the conclusion that:

> A high proportion of American investments, and even of American consumption in the postwar years seems to have been "inflation-induced" rather than "autonomous." . . . There are potent reasons for fearing that the natural defense against a slump in America may now be weaker than at any previous period in history. . . . Some downturn in American business activity is dangerously possible. . . .

In Asia, the Communists are, quite naturally, linking independence with the trend toward economic neutralism. This has already made serious inroads in Ceylon, Burma and Indonesia, countries dependent on the price of raw materials which US policy is forcing downward. The much touted Point Four help is a less meaningful factor than the very real US aid to a renascent Japanese economy.

Political and military factors play their part, too. Few Asiatics believe the official US disclaimers of involvement with General Li Mi and the Chinese Nationalists in North Burma. Nor do they accept the French (and now also the US) view that the Viet-Namese war is entirely anti-Communist. But the economic factor is the most important.

This is shown by the return to grace in Moscow of Grigorii Petrovich Kosyachenko, who has become chairman of the Gosplan, and of Nikita S. Khrushchev, who has become First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party (replacing Malenkov himself). The first, a disciple of Nikolai Voznessensky (who disappeared in 1949), is an industrial planner, the second an agricultural planner; both are economic nationalits of the first magnitude. The economic emphasis is also suggested by the fact that since the return of Thorez, the Communists in France and Italy are turning back to a strengthening of their hold on the labor unions, and of their prestige in the working classes.

Paris FRANK GORRELL

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STEVENSON IN THE PHILIPPINES

by David Sternberg

OF THE Philippines leg of Governor Adlai Stevenson's Far Eastern survey tour, it must be said that neither he nor the Philippines appeared at their best. Where Mr. Stevenson fell short of expectations, of course, the fault lay entirely with the exigencies of a tight schedule. Thus, the famed Stevenson wit and mastery of phrase, eagerly awaited by oratory-loving Filipinos, was limited to a single brief after-luncheon statement, a half-hour press conference, and several minutes of radio message. Where Stevenson erred on the side of discretion, however, in understaying his welcome, the Philippines could claim no such graceful embarrassment. As President Quirino ruefully admitted in his welcoming remarks, the nation was being seen at its political untidiest.

When the Governor and his party landed at Manila International Airport Thursday evening, March 26, there was no hint in the pleasant tropical night of the tempestuous five days that lay ahead. The cause of the tempest was a dinner to which Stevenson was whisked away by US Ambassador Raymond Spruance. It was a small stag dinner, and among the 22 men at the table were two whom Mr. Stevenson had expressed a desire to meet, but who also were perhaps the most controversial figures in the Philippine Republic's brief history, Sen. José P. Laurel, and ex-Secretary of National Defense Ramon Magsaysay.

A little over a month earlier, Mr. Magsaysay had dramatically ended a colorful two and one-half years as defense secretary with a bitter letter of resignation from the Quirino cabinet. In it he charged that his successful attack on the military phase of the domestic Communist menace—a campaign which had won him the highest praise of Nacionalistas and Liberals alike, as well as international press coverage—was being nullified by failure to effect the social and political reforms needed to combat the ideological threat.

Subsequent efforts to win him back to the Liberal Party fold were unsuccessful and served only to reveal the widening breach between him and the Quirino administration which had been developing since 1951, when his use of the army and specially deputized ROTC cadets effected a clean and peaceful election, but one which resulted in an opposition landslide. Though backed by President Quirino at the time, the exploit had generated resentment within the party which made Magsaysay's cabinet position increasingly difficult.

At a birthday party on March 2 for Senator Laurel, who has never conceded that he lost the election of 1949 to Mr. Quirino, Magsaysay formally became a member of the Nacionalista Opposition Party. Meanwhile, Senator Laurel had declared his withdrawal from the presidential race next November and pledged support to Magsaysay as Nacionalista candidate.

During the month of March, little else has been talked about or written about in the Philippines. The debate as to whether or not Magsaysay has been the victim of a political ruse, or will in fact be given the recognition of popular support by the Nacionalistas which his own party withheld, will not be resolved until the Nacionalista convention is held on April 12. (Opposition from old-line stalwarts within the Nacionalista Party itself further complicates the question.) But it is generally agreed that Senator Laurel's strategy as head of the minority party has inflicted upon the incumbent Liberals a painful, if not mortal, wound.

Though the elections are still seven months off, political charge and counter-charge already have mounted to a crescendo as the Liberals concentrate on what, in the local phrase, is an effort to "de-glamorize" their once-favorite son. That US Government officialdom in Manila should become a subsidiary target was inevitable. The Magsaysay anti-Communist effort entailed close cooperation with the US Joint Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG); his successes attracted the notice of an American press eager to note and applaud a promising counterattack on Communist encroachment in the Far East; and two and a half years of doing official business have won Magsaysay many warm and sympathetic friends in the American and European community. If the Magsaysay story is to be destroyed, its sources likewise must be discredited.

Stevenson knew little of this as he met the leading questions of reporters. He was asked to comment on the matter of "Asians fighting Asians," and he noted that "war is not a matter of race—it has to do with principles." He was pressed on the military outlook of the Korean War.

"That's a military question," he observed. "The highest I ever got was apprentice seaman in the United States Navy."

Later, at dinner, local political overtones were present, of course, in the very nature of the guest list, but the presence of the administration's Secretary of Foreign Af-

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fairs, "Mike" Elizalde, seemed to achieve balance and certainly ruled out the likelihood of Nacionalista proselytizing. Altogether, there was no reason for the Governor to suspect that his first meal in Manila would produce the headlines that broke before his departure the following Monday night.

There was no dearth of popular interest or press coverage for every step of the Governor's itinerary, for, during the recent campaign, he had in the Philippines—perhaps uniquely outside the continental US—a man-in-the-street following. Top stratum Filipino interest in American politics is common enough, since so much of the nation's economic as well as political destiny has been determined by the partisan shifts of American policy, but it was startling to find household servants in Manila—usually unconcerned with even their domestic politics—ready to hazard a guess regarding the Eisenhower-Stevenson contest and prepared to defend their judgment.

However, out of almost an hour of visiting with President Quirino at Malacanan, the dogged, but obviously disappointed, press was able to report to the Governor's public only the fact that he had murmured "Superb!" at sight of the Presidential Palace's huge crystal chandeliers; that he and the President had discussed only his impressions of Japan, Korea, Formosa and Hong Kong; and that, in signing the Malacanan visitor's register, he had given his profession as lawyer, observing, "I think it's better to give my profession when I was still an honest man." The President's reaction was that Mr. Stevenson was a "man of action . . . breezy and wide awake. . . . I felt [said Mr. Quirino] as if I had known him for a century."

That afternoon, MSA officials took the visitors to the Los Baños agricultural school, about an hour drive south of Manila through coconut and rice lands and past the salt beds of Cavite. Rehabilitation and expansion of this oldest Philippines agricultural center of research and training is one of the MSA's top priority projects. From it is expected to originate and be disseminated the advanced methodology that could drive Philippine productivity sharply upward from its present base of almost medieval primitiveness. Valuable research had long been done here, and it was hoped that the new, MSA-inspired extension service would at last close the gap between scholarship and the fertile but low-yielding farms of the nation. During the last war, Los Baños housed the second largest concentration of American internees; was the scene of one of the war's most dramatic rescues when an amphibious assault across Laguna de Bay snatched the American civilians imprisoned there from under the noses of an overwhelming enemy force; was almost completely destroyed in the battle of liberation.

Everything was most cordial. Official circles were able to note with some relief that great delicacy and tact were being displayed in avoiding any of the sensitive areas of the moment. And the press and general public had still in prospect the luncheon in Baguio to which President Quirino had invited the Governor and his party. Baguio, major vacation resort of the Philippines, less than 150 air miles from tropical Manila, offers a striking climatic contrast. Pine-clad mountain slopes replace the heavy jungle flora of the lowlands; sweaters and woolens are useful, and log fires in the evening welcome. All who can afford the trip, and many who cannot, make the annual trek.

At luncheon in the Picnic Grove of the Presidential Mansion House next day, the setting seemed perfect for a warmly satisfying wind-up, satisfying to visitors and hosts alike. Various branches of the Philippine government were well-represented, the foreign diplomatic corp, a generous leavening of civic leaders and educators, and—hovering on the outskirts in alert anticipation—the press and radio.

This time there was no disappointment. President Quirino's extemporaneous opening remarks paid tribute to his guest's capabilities and stature, applauded the high-minded spirit in which he had taken his electoral defeat, and deplored the fact that his survey of the Philippines scene found the nation in a state of political dishevelment, "when our people's minds are becoming befuddled in a too early electoral commotion." The President further expressed the hope that Mr. Stevenson, "analytical as he is . . . will see through this maze [of] superficial, partisan political confusion . . . a local competition to show what element of this country is more earnest in cleaning this country of graft and corruption and who is more glamorous. . . . "

Mr. Stevenson responded with a deftly humorous touch designed to reassure his host and establish rapport with his audience, then moved quickly into a more sober discussion of the importance of the Philippines experience with democratic process in the eyes of their Asian neighbors; of the urgent problems that face the region and the need for close co-operation in their solution. Tactfully admitting the tremendous emotional obstacles involved, he came to grips with at least one controversial local issue in a strong appeal for rapprochement between the Philippines and Japan.

When at last, late in the afternoon, the luncheon ended and guests began to leave the pleasant garden spot for their traditional siestas, many were heard to murmur "delightful, delightful." But the press still had some questions to ask of the President and he invited them

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into the Mansion House for a conference. It was a relaxed conference until one of the longer lulls when, suddenly, the President brought his listeners bolt upright and sent them racing for telephones and telegraph desks.

Monday morning's headlines in all Manila papers startled the nation with Mr. Quirino's bitter charge that the US Embassy was interfering in domestic politics, that its partiality to the Nacionalistas had been betrayed in the Thursday night "banquet" for Governor Stevenson, when he had been surrounded by Nacionalistas while only one Liberal, Foreign Secretary Elizalde, had been invited. Smaller headlines noted the fact that three key Liberals, chairmen of important House committees, were filing resolutions aimed at initiating investigations of "aliens meddling in domestic politics," punishable under Philippine law by imprisonment and deportation. And, as *coup de grace*, the Malacanan information office issued officially the text of an article which had appeared in the Washington publication, *Bataan,* charging a plot among certain members of the Pentagon hierarchy to build up for the Presidency a certain Filipino official, unnamed but obviously Mr. Magsaysay.

The keenly awaited press conference Mr. Stevenson had promised to hold before his departure was not a very spirited one. Once local reporters established that the Governor had no comments on the day's turbulent news, they could think of little else of interest, and the half-hour session developed no new thoughts of major significance.

Later, speaking privately with this writer, Mr. Stevenson expressed some concern over the almost obsessive preoccupation with the game of politics here, and wondered what effect it would have on the nation's progress during the long campaign ahead. He also indicated that he wished there had been time to discuss the relative merits of the MSA government-to-government method of administering American economic aid, as employed in the Philippines, versus the method of direct technician-to-farmer contact, which was proving so successful in Formosa under the Joint Committee for Rural Reconstruction (JCRR).

At the airport, before departing for Singapore, Mr. Stevenson made a last effort to establish the American position by wishing "peace and prosperity to both the Nacionalista and Liberal parties." It is as well that he was spared the report in next morning's papers that a Liberal congressman had observed darkly, "He still put the Nacionalistas first. . . ."

"SINCERITY . . . ATTESTED BY DEEDS"

by Harry Conn

ON THE SAME DAY that President Eisenhower made his "sincerity . . . attested by deeds" speech to the nation's newspaper editors, several newspapers were bringing to light a deed by the President and his Defense Secretary knifing three widely proclaimed principles of the new Administration.

In speech after speech the President has maintained that he would work toward reducing the dollar gap between ourselves and our allies, foster and encourage free competition and cut government spending. In one, single action, Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, with the full approval and concurrence of the President, has reduced all three principles to words, not deeds.

This sweeping move was the summary rejection of a low bid by a British firm to supply four large generators and 10 transformers for the Chief Joseph Dam near Brewster, Washington. The British price was almost one million dollars lower than the lowest American bid. The savings to the government, adding in custom duties, would have amounted to $1,613,011.

The rejection was not an isolated administrative decision. It followed disputes in two cabinet meetings, the intervention by the British Ambassador and a heavy campaign of pressure by the American electrical industry. Four American bids were turned down along with the British.

No official explanation of the rejection was made to the bidders. The New York *Journal of Commerce* reported that when an explanation is made, it will be that the Corps of Engineers found it necessary to change specifications. Unofficially, however, it is generally acknowledged that the actual basis for the decision was the "Buy American" Act of 1933. This Act requires the purchase of American goods for public use unless to do so would "unreasonably increase the cost." Recent interpretations of the Act, particularly by the Defense Department under the Truman Administration, provided Secretary Wilson with firm precedent for accepting the British bid, however.

The bids on the dam project were opened last December. The British firm, English Electric Co., Ltd., offered to deliver the equipment involved for a total of $6,238,373. The closest American price was set by two companies—Westinghouse and the Maloney Electric Co.—at $7,170,161.

During the discussions prior to the decision, the State Department and the Mutual Security Agency strongly urged the acceptance of the British bid. Secretary of State

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John Foster Dulles, Undersecretary of State Walter Bedell Smith and MSA head Harold Stassen personally presented their case to the President. And even after Wilson had rejected the bids, Harold F. Linder, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, told a House committee: "It seems to me that the British bidders . . . should have been awarded the contract."

Arrayed on the victorious side of the controversy were some of the key business interests of the country, Secretary of Commerce Sinclair Weeks serving as their spokesman at the White House. Last January the National Electrical Manufacturers' Association filed a brief with the Secretary of the Army arguing that it was desirable for the defense of America and the free world to maintain strong domestic producing companies. The brief questioned whether, in the event of war, if this country were cut off from the United Kingdom, the equipment could be properly serviced. English Electric replied that in such event three Canadian firms were fully capable of providing service.

The fundamental arguments for rejection, however, were hinged upon the "Buy American" Act. Passed in 1933, in the heart of the depression, when American industry could ill afford to lose a single order, the Act provided that when the cost of the domestic product is unreasonable purchases may be made from foreign sources.

The procurement division of the Treasury Department established a scale of reasonable cost provisions. It ruled that the differential must be 100 percent when the foreign bid was $100 or less, 25 percent when the bid exceeded $100. The differential was in addition to the tariff. The Defense and Interior Departments largely followed this interpretation but made provisions for department heads to review cases where the differential was less than 25 percent. In the Defense Department this has been the practice when the total bid exceeded $25,000.

The Act and its interpretations discouraged foreign firms from making bids. An Italian manufacturer of microscopes, Officine Galileo (of Milan), has been an interesting recent exception. He made a determined effort to enter the American market and was encouraged by the Italian government to earn dollars and thus reduce Italian dependence on American aid. He succeeded in securing some orders even after payment of the 45 percent tariff and the addition of the 25 percent differential. The contracts were awarded over the violent objections of the American companies. In a later order Galileo failed to meet the 25 percent differential even though it would have meant a saving to the Federal government of $80,000. The domestic firm insisted that the award should go to it. The contract was split with the Italian firm.

The Galileo case was referred to by an Italian Government Memorandum on January 15, 1952 discussing the impact of import restrictions. The memo said:

> The "Buy American" Act . . . has become altogether obsolete and anachronistic under the conditions of full employment which have prevailed in the United States during the last ten years. . . . Because of these difficulties Italy is losing important opportunities of work and the means of earning the much-needed dollars for her purchases in the United States, and Italian industry is prevented from helping to relieve the shortages being encountered in the defense production.

The State Department replied to the Italian government that it recognized the need for a re-examination of the "Buy American" policy in the light of present conditions.

Six months later, June, 1952, the Defense Department did take action. A directive was issued signed by the then Deputy Defense Secretary William C. Foster, former head of the Mutual Security Agency, placing foreign and domestic supply sources on equal footing unless there was some special circumstance such as depressed labor conditions.

There are some recent examples of procurement of foreign goods in preference to domestic products. In one instance electrical power equipment was purchased from a Swiss firm at a savings of $245,000. In another case, also for electrical equipment, a British firm was awarded the contract when it underbid an American firm.

The US Chamber of Commerce is strong in its denunciation of the "Buy American" restrictions. In a recently published pamphlet on "International Trade Policy Issues," the Chamber concluded:

> The "Buy American" restrictions increase government spending by compelling agencies to pay premium price. To the extent that the "Buy American" legislation prevents foreign countries from selling their products in the American market, it aggravates the dollar deficit problem.

Even in the light of all this, Secretary Wilson turned down the English Electric bid on the Chief Joseph Dam equipment. Reportedly, the President admitted that the law was "terrible" but it was on the books and should be respected.

Also on the books are the President's words of last October spoken at the New York *Herald-Tribune* Forum:

> I think that, in concert with our closest allies, a long-term consistent program should be produced, directing all of our economic power toward reviving free world economies and trade as a whole, instead of restricting our concern to emergency relief and isolated, piecemeal actions.

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THE PLAN FOR SOCIAL INSECURITY

V. SEASON FOR PLUNDER

by Jean Begeman

OF ALL THE campaign promises made by General Eisenhower, the pledge to strengthen and extend the social-security system was the one he forthrightly repeated in every major speech. However, there are strong indications today that the present program will not be extended and that, instead, millions of workers who have paid into the present pension fund will never receive the higher benefits which they have been paying for and which they will require when they reach retirement age.

The new attack on the social-security system is being directed by Republican Congressional leaders, who for 20 years have opposed every legislative advancement of the program; by the big insurance companies, which have opposed federal insurance for the aged on the grounds that it is "competition;" and by the US Chamber of Commerce, which has already made successful inroads into the Administration's new Health, Education and Welfare Department headed by Oveta Culp Hobby.

Rep. Daniel Reed (R, N.Y.), chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, after being publicly rebuked by President Eisenhower for attempting to cut taxes before balancing the budget, flatly stated "there will be no new social-security legislation this year." He then assured delay of any action by proposing a "study" of the whole social-security problem and promptly appointed Rep. Carl T. Curtis (R, Nebr.), an outspoken foe of the federal social-security program, to carry out the investigation.

As far back as 1949, Representative Curtis, expressing minority views in a report on social-security amendments, called the program "grossly unsound and ineffective" and recommended that "overhauling should be done, even though it proves necessary to abandon completely those concepts on which the present program rests. . . ."

Representative Curtis—along with Sens. Robert Taft (R, Ohio) and Hugh Butler (R, Nebr.)—was an early advocate of a "pay-as-you-go" pension system under which benefits would be met each year out of current revenues and pensions would be paid to all aged persons at a flat rate.

An offspring of this scheme is now being peddled nationwide by the US Chamber of Commerce which met last month at Chicago to plan the promotion of this program along the lines of the American Medical Association's propaganda campaign against "socialized" medicine three years ago. The private insurance companies which aided the AMA in its drive will also be at the side of the Chamber of Commerce in this drive to stop any further progress of federal participation in the field of social security. The insurance companies view the present program as "creeping Socialism" aimed at taking over the entire field of insurance despite the fact that in 1951 life-insurance companies had 86 million policy-holders and almost $69 billion in assets.

Last year Leroy Lincoln, chairman of the board of the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, warned that "if the level or scope of social-security benefits is such that it leaves little room for individual effort or for private group effort, it most certainly is too high." He pointed out that benefits had already climbed to $80 a month for certain individuals and as high as $150 a month for families, saying "there are those who would push them even higher!"

The select panel of speakers at the Chicago C of C meeting revealed the strength behind this latest attempted raid on the multi-million dollar social-security fund that has been built up since the program began in 1935. The 400 delegates heard Charles A. Siegfried (Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.), Henry D. Allens (US Steel Co.), Carl N. Jacobs (Hardware Mutual Casualty Co.), Arthur T. Leonard (City National Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago), Dorrance C. Bronson (Wyatt Co. of Washington, D. C.), A. D. Marshall (General Electric Co.), Dean M. Mitchell (Northern Indiana Public Service Co.), Leonard J. Calhoun, Washington, D. C., attorney and former lobbyist for Unemployment Benefit Advisors (a group of employers opposed to improving the social-security program), two members of the House of Representatives, Carl Curtis (R, Nebr.) and Thomas Curtis (R, Mo.), among others.

On paper, the C of C plan looks like a change in the right direction. It calls for universal retirement-insurance coverage for every one over 65, to be paid for out of payroll deductions of all gainfully employed workers. The C of C would add to the 60 million now covered by present social security five million farm operators and workers, transient domestic workers, self-employed professionals, ministers, and five million civilian employees of federal, state and local governments.

Proponents of the C of C plan argue that it would be

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less complex than the present system; that it would not encourage pressures for excessive benefits (there would be no $18 billion trust fund as there is now because the income from social-security payroll deductions runs about $4 billion a year, and the benefits paid out less than $3 billion; eventually the gap will close); and it would eliminate the necessity of projecting costs into an "unpredictable future."

The latter point is one which Rep. Carl Curtis emphasized in his speech at Chicago:

> Social-Security actuaries talk about the benefits, the cost and coverage of the [present] program in the year 2000. This means that we are now enacting legislation binding the citizens in the year 2000 as to how they shall meet their social obligations, how much they shall pay out in benefits, and how much taxes they shall pay. . . . How would we react today if we were forced to honor today's social obligations as determined by the Congress of 50 years ago?

When Curtis presented the same argument in his minority report a few years ago, he added:

> It is totally unmoral. Let us permit our children and our grandchildren to decide how much per year they of their generation will pay for social security. We should not bind them by contract to pay untold billions each year, as the present system does. The right of self-government means not only freedom from kings, tyrants and dictators, but it means freedom from the past.

Federal grants for the needy aged now come out of general federal revenue based on taxes on corporations and on individuals' ability to pay. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance fund, of which workers pay half the cost through their payroll deductions, would be greatly reduced under the C of C plan. With universal coverage giving all aged a flat $25 per month (about half the average monthly grant paid workers over 65 today), the burden would fall on covered workers whose contributions have been intended for their own security.

If the Chamber's proposal is adopted, Congress will decide each year on the amount of payroll tax to be levied. Charles Siefried of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. told Chamber delegates that the "concept of pay-as-you-go envisions a periodic re-examination by Congress of the social-security taxes in light of the emerging experience and the conditions which are likely to be experienced in the period just ahead. In times of rapid change in costs, these re-examinations might have to be at shorter intervals." This is the crux of the new scheme since it would turn social security into social "insecurity." Opponents point out that if an economy-minded Congress failed to levy enough taxes to cover the benefits, there is danger that, as more people reach retirement age, either the amount of the pension would be cut even lower or a future Congress would be forced to levy such a high payroll tax on wages that many working people could not afford to pay it.

Three top Chamber of Commerce officials—Leonard Calhoun, Reinhard Hohaus, vice-president of Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., and A. D. Marshall of General Electric—have been selected as consultants on social security by Oveta Culp Hobby, Secretary of the new Department of Health, Education and Welfare which administers the social-security program. Two bankers, an insurance consultant (Robert Burroughs), two farm representatives, an economics professor, a member of the American Public Welfare Association, and two labor representatives round out the advisory group. The labor consultants were added, however, only after pressure was brought to bear. Mrs. Hobby's first two meetings did not include either labor or farm representatives.

Whether or not Mrs. Hobby will recommend social-security legislation to this session of Congress will depend largely upon the decision of her advisory group. President Eisenhower in his State of the Union message told the 83rd Congress that old-age insurance "should be promptly extended to cover millions of citizens who have been left out of the social-security system." Eight days later, after conferring with Congressional leaders, he listed legislation broadening the social-security system as a "must" for action this session. His thinking on the subject of old-age benefits seems to have undergone a genuine change from the time when, as President of Columbia University, he remarked that anyone who was really looking for security could find it in a federal prison. But the ultimate test of his conviction will lie in whether or not he yields to the powerful Chamber of Commerce lobby.

Let's Get Out the New Road Map

—Washington, D. C. Chamber of Commerce

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A TRUCE IS NO ANSWER IN KOREA

by Tom Fitzsimmons

THE League of Nations cowered before aggression and died. The United Nations has put an international force into Korea, lives and promises to mature. But in meeting the test which killed the League, the UN has taken on a problem the League never had to contemplate—how to prevent the economic and moral ravages of war from giving an aggressor the victory his army failed to win. Any immediate truce in Korea will leave that nation divided until a full political settlement can be made. The parts will then exert a powerful attraction upon one another and sooner or later one will dominate. In the simplest terms, then, the UN must erase the consequences of war in South Korea faster than Russia can do so in North Korea or lose the war.

That contest will be a trial by fire of the democratic system as against the Communist system and, coupled to the similar contest waged in Europe since World War II, its outcome will demonstrate, dramatically and concretely, which system can best provide a decent way of life for the poverty-seared millions of Asia and the Middle East. The contest is by no means unequal, for although 80 percent of Korea's prewar industry is in North Korea, South Korea is the bread-basket; both parts are equally battered, and Russia's record in Europe is far from an indication of invincibility.

Statistics are lifeless and generalities abusive. Yet we must use both if we are to arrive at something like an accurate understanding of conditions in a nation which for over three years has been the arena for some of the most destructive fighting in history.

Millions of South Koreans are displaced, millions cannot earn enough to live and must depend on relief, almost all are underfed, tens of thousands have and thousands will freeze and starve to death. Homes and power, manufacturing and transportation facilities valued at a minimum of $2 billion have been destroyed or badly damaged. A million or more civilians have perished. South Korean production has fallen to $950 million a year—$44 for each man, woman and child—from a 1949-50 total of $1.35 billion. These figures are reflected in the fact that at least one million able men are totally unemployed and that probably one-third of the entire manpower of the nation is not effectively utilized. Many other resources are equally untapped. All this in the midst of a violent inflation and a savagely low level of consumption—both of which cause hoarding, speculation and corruption.

Destruction of men and material has resulted in a crucial shortage of consumer's goods. These must now be bought abroad with hard currency. But this basic cause of hardship has been aggravated into inflation largely through the shortsighted policy of the UN Command, essentially a US responsibility, which has caused South Korea to be flooded with currency—currency which immediately began to chase scarce goods and to lose value. Every month the government of the Republic of Korea has had to advance some $4 million of local currency so that the UN Command could pay the labor it hired. If an equal amount of dollar credit had been made available for the importation of goods on which that local currency could have been spent, South Korea's economy might have benefited. Instead an incredible delay in settling accounts threw printing-press currency, unsupported by goods, into the market month after month. To complete the vicious circle, a payments agreement was further delayed by US insistence that repayment be made at the devalued rate.

Such is South Korea's situation: destruction of property by war, destruction of values by inflation.

The reconstruction of South Korea to the point where she can become self-supporting through the maximum utilization of her resources requires capital investment. Once her gross national product reaches the per-capita level of 1949-50 ($67), that investment can come largely from within the country. But to reach that minimum level her gross national product will have to be increased by 80 percent, and the capital necessary to achieve that increase must be supplied by foreign aid.

A preliminary report by the Nathan Associates, now surveying reconstruction needs, estimates South Korea can be self-supporting by 1960 if a total of $1.75 billion of foreign aid is injected into her economy during the next seven years. Actually this figure assumes security-expenditures no higher than the very low prewar rate and is probably too conservative. The greater the amount of investment in Korea, the sooner more Koreans will work, exploit resources, produce and sell. An investment of $3 billion over the next six years, annual amounts increased as possibilities of effective utilization increase, is probably a more realistic figure. Since it costs well over $3 billion a year to fight the war, it does not seem excessive to spend an equal amount on the peace.

Nearly $500 million for relief is needed quickly to plug the inflationary gap between consumption needs and production, especially since the capital investment and credit policies necessary to reconstruction are in

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closed, the most effective anti-inflation measure would be large-scale importation of consumer goods. Sale of these will absorb the money for labor, material, etc., paid out in the course of reconstruction. Anti-inflation and reconstruction programs, then, must be implemented simultaneously, and must be controlled by an over-all plan co-ordinating both programs with measures assuring quick dollar settlement by the US for local currency advances and the quick conversion of those dollars into consumer goods by the government of the Republic of Korea.

Such a plan would have to be formulated in terms of both fundamental and specific goals. Fundamentally the plan should aim (1) at an economic structure permitting a rising standard of living within such austerity as required to allow accumulation of investment capital, (2) at independence from economic domination by another nation, (3) at maximum exploitation of modern technology in terms of human benefits, and (4) at the reunification of Korea. Specifically the plan should give priority to development of agriculture so that the nation may feed herself and export a surplus of rice, and, for similar reasons, to development of the fishing industries. It should provide for extensive surveys of the mineral and fuel potentialities of South Korea as well as of hydroelectric power sources so that exports may be increased and imports decreased. And it should blueprint the reconstruction, expansion and reorganization of manufacturing, transport and distribution facilities. As reconstruction moves forward, production goals by sector, then by specific industry, should be set.

Unfortunately no such over-all plan has yet been conceived. The government of the Republic of Korea has done the best planning job, but no real co-ordination between its efforts, those of the UN command, and those of the UN agencies involved exists. Some effort in that direction is now being made, however: President Eisenhower has appointed Henry J. Tasca his special representative on Korean economic affairs. Tasca's recommendations should carry considerable weight, and his presence in Korea will fill a responsibility vacuum.

On the financial side, the government of the Republic of South Korea instituted currency conversion and froze some bank deposits early this year—a step which, since it was done before stabilization was achieved, has done little but change the name of the currency from Won to Hwan and raise its official exchange value from 6,000 to 60 to the dollar. More important is the February, 1953, settlement by which the US finally paid $85 million for Won advanced to the UN Command before January 1, 1952, and agreed to monthly settlements totaling some $50 million a year. None of these settlements will ease inflation, however, until the sums involved are converted into imports of consumer goods. This is not solely the responsibility of the government of the Republic of Korea. The Economic Co-ordination Agreement of June, 1952, provides for a Combined Economic Board with equal representation from the Republic of Korea and the UN command. That agreement also stipulated a $35 million settlement for Won advances made after January 1, 1952. The Economic Board first spent considerable time arguing about organizational structure, then argued some more about what imports the money should be spent for: months of increasing inflation went by before the government of the Republic was allowed to import anything.

The government of the Republic will, however, be largely responsible for fiscal and credit policies to curb inflation without hindering reconstruction. Gerhart Colm, the man largely responsible for the successful stablization of German currency after World War II, has been sent to Korea by the Nathan Associates to help.

Also on the financial side, the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency will very probably raise its projected expenditures from some $70 million in fiscal 1953 to the neighborhood of $125 million in fiscal 1954. If the spending of these funds is kept flexible so that a substantial proportion can be spent on consumer goods for sale, the balance can probably be prevented from adding to inflationary pressure.

These steps indicate a general awareness of what will be needed to obtain the independence, both economic and political, of a land already soaked in the blood of men from many nations, and to attain the UN goal of a unified Korea. But they are only first steps.

Beyond the problem of Korea stretches another and vaster problem—Japan and Southeast Asia. Because of the Korean War the US spends some $800 million a year in Japan. A truce will not immediately affect those expenditures since the UN army will have to remain in Korea for some time. But sooner or later the Korean issue will be settled. And if the economy of Japan, where the Communists are noisy if not yet strong, is not to suffer badly, such matters as Japanese trade with China, her historical market, will have to be given careful consideration.

The problem of trade with China will in turn raise the issue of the admission of China to the UN, and that in turn the question of Formosa. The economies of Japan and the nations of Southeast Asia unsupported by either China trade or a Korean War will present the problem of a Far East payments union. And the security of the entire area must eventually cause speculation on a Pacific Defense Organization.

If they are to be resolved intelligently, questions of this magnitude cannot be examined too soon.

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LITERATURE AND THE ARTS

THE CHALLENGE OF THE CHRISTIAN ENIGMA

A letter from C. G. Jung to Upton Sinclair

I HAVE READ your book *A Personal Jesus* carefully and with great interest. It is certainly of great merit and will help your public to appreciate a religious figure anew. I was curious to see in which way you would tackle such a difficult task as the reconstruction of a biography of Jesus. Being the son of a parson, and having grown up in an atmosphere steeped in theology, I learnt about a number of attempts such as those of Strauss, Renan, Moore, and others; and in later years I was an ardent reader of Albert Schweitzer's work. I have repeatedly, *i.e.* at different phases of my life, tried to realise what kind of personality—explaining the whole effect of its existence—could be reconstructed from the scanty historical evidence offered by the New Testament. Having had a good deal of experience in psychology, I should have been sufficiently equipped for such a task, but in the end I came to the conclusion that, owing on the one hand to the paucity of historical data, and on the other to the abundance of mythological admixture, I was unable to reconstruct a personal character free from rather fatal contradictions.

You have certainly succeeded in presenting an acceptable picture of a certain Jesus. I should venture to say that it is even a likely portrait of such a presumably unique character. It may even be convincing to a modern American mind, but seen from the standpoint of a European scientist, your *modus procedendi* seems to be a bit too selective; that is, you exclude too many authentic statements for no other reason than that they do not fit in with your premises, for instance, predestination and esoterism, which cannot be excluded for textual reasons. They cannot be dismissed as mere interpolations. There is also incontestable textual evidence for the fact that Jesus foresaw his tragic end. Moreover, you exclude practically the whole overwhelming amount of eschatology, the authenticity of which is undeniable, whether it offends our reason or not.

Then you paint a portrait; though of high literary quality, it is subject to the same critique you apply to John the Evangelist: "We are going to learn what this Hellenized intellectual thinks about Jesus." We learn from your book what a modern American writer "thinks about Jesus." This is not meant to be derogatory; on the contrary, it merely shows my perplexity. Surely, we can draw a portrait of Jesus that does not offend our rationalism, but it is done at the expense of our loyalty to the textual authority. As a matter of fact, we can omit nothing from the authentic text. We cannot create a true picture of Hermetic philosophy in the fourth century if we dismiss half of the books contained in the *Corpus Hermeticum*.

The New Testament, as it stands, is the *Corpus Christianum*, which is to be accepted as a whole, or not at all. We can dismiss nothing that stands up to a reasonable philological critique. We cannot suppress any single contradiction because we have no anterior, or better, or more reliable evidence. We have to take the whole and make the best of it.

The *Corpus Christianum* tells the story of a God-Man and of the various ways in which His life and teaching were understood. If Jesus was, as you portray Him, a rationally understandable teacher of fine morals and a devout believer in a good Father-God, why should the Gospels be stuffed with miracle stories and Jesus Himself saddled with esoteric and eschatological statements, showing Him in the role of a Son-God and cosmological saviour?

If Jesus had been indeed nothing but a great teacher hopelessly mistaken in His messianic expectations, we should be at a complete loss in understanding His historical effect which is so clearly visible in the New Testament. If, on the other hand, we cannot understand by rational means what a God-Man is, then we don't know what the New Testament is all about. But it would be just our task to understand what is meant by a "God-Man."

You give an excellent picture of a possible religious teacher, but you give us no understanding of what the New Testament tries to tell, namely the life, fate, and effect of a God-Man, whom we are asked to believe to be a divine revelation.

These are the reasons why I should propose to deal with the Christian *Urphaenomen* in a somewhat different way. I think we ought to admit that we don't understand the riddle of the New Testament. With our present means we cannot unravel a rational story from it unless we interfere with the texts. If we take this risk we can read various stories into the texts and we can give them even a certain amount of probability.

First, Jesus is an idealistic, religious teacher of great wisdom, who knows that His teaching would make the necessary impression only if He were willing to sacrifice His life for it. Thus He forces the issue in complete foreknowledge of the facts which He intends to happen.

Second, Jesus is a highly strung, forceful personality, forever at variance with His surroundings, and possessed of a terrific will to power. Yet being of superior intelligence, He perceives that it would not do to assert it on the worldly plane of political sedition as so many similar zealots in His days had done. He rather prefers the role of the old prophet and reformer of His people, and He institutes a spiritual kingdom

The Editors are grateful to Dr. C. G. Jung and to Mr. Upton Sinclair for their permission to publish this letter. A Personal Jesus, *by Upton Sinclair ($3.50) was published in 1952 by the Evans Publishing Company.*

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instead of an unsuccessful political rebellion. For this purpose He adopts not only the messianic Old Testament expectations, but also the then popular "Son of Man" figure of the *Liber Henoch*. But meddling with the political whirlpool in Jerusalem, He gets Himself caught in its intrigues and meets a tragic end with a full recognition of His failure.

Third, Jesus is an incarnation of the Father-God. As a God-Man, He walks the earth drawing to Himself the *eklektoi* of His Father, announcing the message of universal salvation and being mostly misunderstood. As the crowning of His short career, He performs the supreme sacrifice in offering Himself up as the perfect host, and thus redeems mankind from eternal perdition.

You can make out a pretty good case from the texts for each of these three highly different variants, with the necessary omissions and violations of scriptural authority. The first and second variants are "rational," *i.e.* they happen to be within the frame of our contemporary understanding, while the third is definitely outside it; although before about 1750, nobody thought so.

If we avoid violations of the authentic texts, we have to take into consideration the three possibilities, and perhaps some more, and then we must try to find out which theory would fit the complete picture. Since the Gospels do not give, and do not even intend to give, a biography of the Lord, the mere reconstruction of a life of Jesus could never explain the picture given by the texts. The little we know of His biography must needs be supplemented by a very careful study of the peculiar mental and spiritual atmosphere of the time and place of the gospel writers. People at that time were highly Hellenized. Jesus Himself was under the influence of eschatological literature.

What we call "Jesus Christ" is—I am afraid—much less a biographical problem than a social, *i.e.*, collective, phenomenon, created by the coincidence of an ill-defined yet remarkable personality, with a highly peculiar *Zeitgeist*, that has its own no less remarkable psychology. Having myself given a great deal of thought to the problem of Jesus, and having done also some spadework in this field, I felt I had to give you an account of how and where I slipped up in trying to cope with the challenge of the Christian enigma.

Surely enough, we must believe in reason. But it should not prevent us from recognizing a mystery when we meet one. It seems to me that no rational biography could explain one of the most "irrational" effects ever observed in the history of man. I believe that this problem can only be approached through the history and comparative psychology of symbols. Attempts in this direction have already yielded some interesting results. Unfortunately there are no English publications yet to which I could refer.

THE ADDICTED ARTIST

THE LIFE AND MUSIC OF BELA BARTOK, by Halsey Stevens (Oxford; $7.50).

ACCORDING to its author, "it has nowhere been the intention of this book to examine Bartok's work from the standpoint of its motivations, physical, psychological or otherwise." Ruling out such interpretive elements at the outset, what Mr. Stevens has accomplished is a scholarly, reliable study, the best on its subject available in English at present. Because he never knew Bartok personally, Mr. Stevens has been dependent on published papers and on information contributed by Bartok's friends. Two volumes of the Bartok letters have been published in Hungarian, but the documents necessary for a finally definitive biography are not completely available, and will probably not be accessible for some time. Stevens has built his biography completely on authentic material, and any further study of the composer's life will be only an elaboration of the facts found here.

Such a biography would lend itself easily to a maudlin, melodramatic treatment. Bartok had a hard life. He grew up surrounded by poverty. He was constantly afflicted, like Job, with the most appalling illnesses, domestic catastrophe, and professional failure. During his most productive years, Central Europe was going to hell in a hurry, and all this affected him deeply. His last years, spent in the United States were grim ones; he admitted, very simply, "My career as a composer is as much as finished." At the time of his death, in 1945, his professional outlook was a good bit brighter, but nothing suggested the huge vogue which his works would enjoy after his death.

It was not generally known then that Bartok had declined a number of highly lucrative positions as a teacher of composition, any one of which could have given him a comfortable living for the rest of what would probably have been a much longer life. Instead, he chose a meager and temporary fellowship at Columbia University which allowed him to continue his researches in folk music, but at a terrible cost to his health and state of mind. With so many people and institutions eager to help him, his deliberate choice of poverty and insecurity seems perverse. An easier life would very likely have delayed his general recognition, but the "quasi boycott" which, he complained, seemed to have been placed on his works, would have continued. Right now, such composers as Milhaud, Harris, Piston and the author of this book, Halsey Stevens, are in a professional position similar to that of Bartok in 1943. By choosing the hard way, Bartok died under conditions which charmed and stimulated the popular imagination, and, inadvertently did great service to his posthumous career.

Mr. Stevens is optimistic about the future of Bartok's music, but, at least for the present, this attitude is questionable. The prestige which Bartok's work received after his death was too spectacular to last. Since its zenith about five years ago, the vogue has been declining noticeably, and every year the important performances are becoming less numerous. Bartok may well follow Shostakovich into that Limbo that seems to be reserved for composers who, for one reason or another, have been overcelebrated for a short time.

I doubt it very much, but Stevens' book could conceivably act as a brake to this descent. In view of the excellence of so much of Bartok's work, this would be healthy. Now that the vogue is over, the composer deserves to be built

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back into the repertory and kept there.

Stevens has wisely dealt with the life and the work separately. Except for a few early pieces, the body of Bartok's work is available, and the larger part of this book is devoted to a detailed analysis and criticism of the music, which Stevens has divided into seven convenient, generally acceptable categories. As an analyst, Stevens discusses the theory behind the music as well as its external form, showing its relations both to folk sources and to the more rarified conventions that determine its organization. He has gone to great pains to find the conditions under which each work was composed, and to relate it to Bartok's over-all life-work. As a critic, Stevens is, I think, somewhat indiscreet in his enthusiasm. He does not hesitate to say, of the Milhaud and Hindemith Quartets, that "in quality they can hardly be mentioned in the same breath with Haydn and Mozart and Beethoven, while "Bartok's Quartets alone [in this century] display progressive growth, and all six are worthy to be placed beside those of the Viennese masters." A less reckless statement would have pointed out the similarities between the Quartets of Bartok and Beethoven without exploiting the factionalism so current in our musical life. Milhaud and Hindemith draw their forms and attitudes more from earlier music, and no one wants or expects them to carry on the Beethoven tradition. Indeed, Beethoven's strong influence on Bartok did not produce altogether gratifying results.

Extravagances like this are, fortunately, rare in Mr. Stevens' criticism which is, otherwise, unusually sound. Stevens is at his best, I think, in that part of the chamber music which becomes transparent only after study or explication. The detail is so rich that most of the criticism has to be read with the score in order to be meaningful, but the style of the writing is straightforward and pleasant. It is surprising that such a fine study could appear so soon after the composer's death, but the book is much more useful now than it would have been three years ago, coming as it does at a time when a revaluation of Bartok needs to be begun.

ROBERT EVETT

A MINOR MASTERPIECE

ZORBA THE GREEK, by Nikos Kazantzakis, translated by Carl Wildman (Simon and Schuster; $3.50).

NIKOS KAZANTZAKIS, born in Crete in 1885, has written three books of philosophy, five books of travel, fourteen dramas, nine novels, has translated into Modern Greek Goethe's *Faust*, Dante's *Divine Comedy*, Homer's *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and has composed his own epic of 33,333 verses, *The Odyssey*, which takes up the story where Homer left it. In addition, he has been Director General in the Ministry of Public Welfare under Venizelos, Minister in the Sophoulis Cabinet, Head of the Bureau for Translations from the Classics in UNESCO, and but for the intervention of the Greek government several years ago, for political reasons, would have been awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. He is undoubtedly the most eminent *man of letters* writing in Greek today, and one of the most versatile writers in the world.

Zorba, his best-known novel, written about 1947, has been praised in Greece for representing the volatile Greek temperament, and has been equally condemned for its insult to Greek decorum and its unblinking vulgarity. If read on a literal plane alone, *Zorba* may be said to have no plot worthy of the name, to be deficient in complexity of characterization, to lack motivation, and to fall into pornographic and banal extremities. The mental eye of the reader must refocus, destroying the realistic picturization and language in order to pry out the symbolic figure entwined in the rude landscape. Once the point of view is established, the plan is easily grasped in its magnificent boldness and simplicity, the characters and their actions take on symbolic universality, and the movement becomes that of the shifting anecdote or of the erratic exhuberance of the picaresque tale. A young introverted writer of about thirty, the author himself is reading his pocket Dante in a tavern in Pireaus waiting for his boat to take him to Crete where he has rented a lignite mine for exploitation, and where he means to be immersed in humanity by throwing himself into a life of action, away from his ascetic tendency to bury himself in books and contemplation. He has just said goodbye to his dearest friend, Stavros, who has sailed away to Southern Russia in order to direct the emigration of thousands of suffering Greek refugees. "Happiness," his friend is to write him, "is doing your duty, and the harder the duty the greater the happiness."

At this moment, a tall lean old man of about sixty, who has been gazing at our author through the glass door, bursts in and demands, without preamble, to be taken to Crete as personal cook and manager of the mine. Our ascetic young man is delighted with the boldness and rugged directness of the old codger, whose name is Zorba, so complete an antithesis to his own character, and takes him to Crete. There our author, despising himself for being unable to fling himself into a life of action, purges himself by writing his contemplations on Buddha. After much calculation and planning, Zorba sets up a long runway, on tall pylons, down the mountain slope for the sliding down of tree-trunks. As four huge trunks are sent down it—one each for Father, Son, and Virgin Mary, and one for the Virgin of Revenge—the whole structure collapses, and the young capitalist finds freedom in shrugging off the loss. The two friends part with great sorrow, and some five years later the traveling author hears that Zorba has died laughing, whinnying like an animal, exultant, digging his nails into the windowsill, looking upon the world he was leaving, contemning priests or Christian burial.

Upon this slight structure are hung three main episodes: Zobra's lusty affair with Madame Hortense, the beheading by the villagers on the church steps of a sexy young widow for whom a lovelorn youth had committed suicide, and the burning of the monastery by a schizophrenic monk. These episodes are not depicted in the believable three dimensions of reality, but with the simple and graphic violence of similar episodes in fairy tales or legends. Intermittently the young author hears from his friend of missionary zeal, Stavros, and toward the end of the book, giving it a final frame,

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he learns of his death from pneumonia after bringing his charges to safety.

In essence, the book contrasts three ways of life. Stavros believes in the life of duty and sacrifice. The young author believes that life is a terrible struggle to convert matter into spirit. For Zorba life is the untrammeled indulgence of instinct; though selfish, he is always sympathetic to the indulgence of others and believes it is the aim of man and matter to create joy. His is the large voracious heart, the great brute soul. He believes in nothing but himself, for the world is a ghost known only through an individual's senses. God is just like him, only "bigger, stronger, crazier, and immortal into the bargain." God sits in his hut of cloud with Hell and Paradise to right and left. In His hand He holds a wet sponge, and after listening with boredom to the endless confessions of sinners—flap, slap, He sponges them clean and sends them off to Paradise: "Because God, you know, is a great lord, and that's what being a lord means: to forgive."

Before the sensuous and "profound balderdash" of Zorba, the young author feels that man's anguish has ended decadently in the masterly conjuring tricks of a Mallarmé, in pure poetry, pure music, pure thought, emptied of seed, excrement, or blood; distilled water without bacteria. His writing on Buddha in the center of Zorbas' whirling dervishing becomes a life-and-death struggle against the tremendous force of destruction lurking within every man, a duel with the great NO. If Zorba lives as if eternity is every moment that passes, Buddha is the bottomless well of eternity in which we drown; if Zorba lives as if he were continually the first man reborn, Buddha is the last man who has come too soon in man's history and must be ousted. Once, said Zorba, when as a young man he had an insatiable craving for cherries, he deliberately crammed himself so full of them as to never want them again. And so our young author crams himself with Buddha, with metaphysical speculation and abstraction, and even after parting with Zorba determines on five years of books and learning to cure himself by repletion and purgation. That's how men free themselves, Zorba declares, "by stuffing themselves, not by turning ascetics." Yet when, after several years of separation Zorba writes urgently: "Found a wonderful green stone. Come immediately," our bookworm finds it logically impossible to respond, to act with the Zorbatic "folly" of the untrammeled imagination.

Nikos Kazantzakis has himself written a book on his former teacher at the Sorbonne, Bergson; another book called *Asceticism*; and in his *The Odyssey* has depicted himself as the eternal wanderer seeking to strip himself of all illusion: love, hope, country, eternity, God. *Zorba* is the counterstatement, the necessary antidote, the antithesis identical with its opposite, and it would be an unsubtle mistake to take it on its literal and banal level. It must be read and enjoyed on the level of realistic symbolism, and in that mode it is a minor masterpiece; Rousseau and Rabelais are its godfathers. The translation by Carl Wildman is fresh and vigorous, especially inventive in finding appropriate English equivalents for colloquial Greek and Cretan expressions. KIMON FRIAR

IN LOVE WITH ENGLAND

MY DEAR TIMOTHY, by Victor Gollancz (Simon and Schuster; $5).

"IF THERE HAD BEEN no war," Mr. Gollancz declares in this autobiographical letter to his grandson, "it is possible that I should have been baptized while at Oxford." But whether he had taken this formal step in conversion or not, it would have made no difference in his religious position, which remains today, almost forty years after, what it was then: detestation of his native Judaism and "adoration of Christ."

Gollancz' criticism of Judaism is in terms of its forms or rituals—binding *tephillin* (phylacteries), not riding nor smoking nor making a fire on the Sabbath, eating kosher, and so forth, all of which he finds meaningless and absurd. However, he has to admit that there is more to Jewish Orthodoxy than this formalism, and that "mumbo-jumbo worship is to be found in Christianity as well." He attempts, therefore, a case on the basis principally of the immediacy and directness of Christ's appeal as "a person." Incarnating the Divine nature, which, according to Gollancz, is also man's nature stripped of error and unreality, Christ is in all of us as we are in Him; He is our divine or ideal counterpart: Blake's "I am not the God afar off, I am a brother and friend." But he need not have gone to Christianity for this notion, for in one form or another and with the Godhead under a different name it is quite familiar in the great stream of Jewish mystical thought (the conception of the *Schechina*). The truth is, Gollancz has no convincing reason for his apostasy, except one, and it is not religious but social and cultural.

"I fell in love with England," he confides to Timothy, and the note is struck throughout the book. He rhapsodizes about the West End where he was born and raised, his schooldays at St. Paul's, Sunday afternoons at Covent Garden or the Albert Hall, London streets, shops, trains, "pea-soupers." To describe his feelings about Oxford he has to resort to a paraphrase of the famous passage on Jerusalem in Ansky's *The Dybbuk:*

> In all the world the holiest university is the University of Oxford: in the University of Oxford the holiest college is New College: and in New College the Holy of Holies is New College garden.

And so on in the same vein. Clearly, against this entrancing world of England, English life, ways and customs, the little world of Jewishness and Judaism at his home—those rituals and taboos imposed on him by his orthodox but essentially nonreligious father (they are all of Judaism young Gollancz knows)—must indeed seem empty and irrelevant and utterly alien. "If I took this step (baptism)," he writes on this one and only occasion when the real reason occurs to him, "I should be leaving, once and for all, everything stuffy and outlandish in my Jewish background. I should be gone from the Jewish backwater, I should be swimming down the sunlit waters of the European stream."

Thus, the motivating force here is not any question of belief or religion but social and cultural assimilation. England is Christian, and in identifying

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himself with Christianity, Gollancz only completes his identification with England. He becomes a Christian in order to become the complete Englishman.

And because he is the English convert first and the Christian convert only incidentally, his views, interests and predilections on the social, cultural, political as well as religious planes, take on a markedly—and sometimes an exaggerated—English stamp and coloring. Nowhere is this so sharply underlined as in his treatment of Socialism, the closing theme of the book. Despite a certain obvious affinity in the subject with Judaism (social justice and social equality are originally Hebraic conceptions), Gollancz proceeds to baptize Socialism: and what emerges is a brand of social reform and ameliorism uniquely English. Gollancz is a Christian Socialist, in the "good will, good works" tradition of the Kingsleys, Maurices or present Tawneys.

There is a pithy little remark Gollancz is prone to drop in certain moments. "But I am a Jew at heart," he'll aver. (Did we not hear that from Heine, Wedekind, Werfel, *et alia?*) This sounds confusing, but it makes excellent sense, for Jewish apostasy (formal or otherwise) must be regarded principally as a phenomenon in social and cultural assimilation rather than as a religious change of heart.

MICHAEL FRAENKEL

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THE SIMPLE MILLIONAIRES

THOSE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS, by Joe Alex Morris (Harper; $3.50).

ALL OVER THE WORLD, society seems to have decided that huge private fortunes shall no longer be permitted. In some countries, they have shot the possessors of such fortunes; in other cases, big estates are being broken up by income and inheritance taxes.

This fact gives something of a gentle, nostalgic glow to Mr. Morris's account of the currently active generation of the Rockefellers, the five grandchildren of the family's founder, who are David, John D. III, Laurance, Nelson and Winthrop. He calls them "five extraordinary young men," and perhaps the adjective is justified in that they have resisted the temptation to make fools of themselves, in nightclubs and elsewhere, to which other sons of millionaries have sometimes succumbed. In a more positive sense, these young men are extraordinary chiefly if it is extraordinary to be hard-working, simple in your habits, and imbued with a desire to help your fellowmen (not all five, of course, share these characteristics in exactly equal proportions).

As Mr. Morris points out, there was not much need for the five brothers to imitate their overacquisitive, overaggressive grandfather, who at one time had an income of $30 million a year. There was also no point in their trying to duplicate the philanthropic activities of their father, John D. Jr., who completed the task of giving away a total of about four-fifths of a billion. They have therefore settled down into the normal lives of the well-behaved rich. Some of them are in family enterprises like Rockefeller Center; all of them are involved in various ways with family and other philanthropies. The author calculates that among them, the five brothers are members of and active in about 200 worthy causes, not allowing for duplication. Naturally, any charity or philanthropy is happy to have a Rockefeller on its board of directors, on the well justified assumption that if he should become interested enough to make a contribution of his own, he can afford it. Indeed, if all the people who try to get money out of one or another of the Rockefeller philanthropies in the course of a year were to buy a copy of this book, it would promptly go on the best seller list.

Mr. Morris tells us, conscientiously, that David is a passionate entomologist and political economist; that Nelson and Winthrop can cook; that Nelson and Laurance, as boys, raised rabbits and sold them to a laboratory. Nelson, Winthrop and David all got speeding tickets in their salad days; John, the quietest of the five, peddled advertisements for the college paper when he was in Princeton. Laurance, with a passion for speed, used to commute down the Hudson by motorboat, and is interested in aviation. Nelson is today probably the best known of the five, because of his activities during and since the war in trying to improve basic economic conditions in various Latin American countries. Not all his projects have been equally successful, but some of them have been brilliantly so, fine illustrations of the unselfish, technologically sound Point Four approach at its best. In these days when progressive education is under such bitter attack, it is worth recording that four of these five well adjusted brothers went to the Lincoln School in New York City, once the leading exemplar of this type of training in the country.

Much of Mr. Morris's book is devoted to describing such outstanding family philanthropies as the Rockefeller Foundation and the Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research. (The most striking single story is how the site for the United Nations was obtained, in a dramatic all-night struggle just before the deadline.) Without attempting to solve the perennial question whether private philanthropy on the whole justifies its existence, he makes it clear that these Rockefeller enterprises have done an enormous amount of highly useful work at a time when no other institution, public or private, was prepared to undertake it. Considering the fact that goodness is usually rather dull, and that the Rockefeller boys are and always have been good, this book is livelier than anyone has the right to expect. BRUCE BLIVEN

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FROM LEO X TO PIUS XII

by Eric Bentley

POSSIBLY the contribution of the Group Theatre was not a particular production, nor even the sum of its productions, it was a contribution to the theory and practice of theatrical education. As a result, some of the most interesting theatre work of today is done in the classrooms and studios of ex-Groupers like Elia Kazan, Lee Strasberg, Robert Lewis, Stella Adler, Sanford Meisner.

Last week I was privileged to see Mr. Meisner's production of *Mandragola* at the Neighborhood Playhouse. I say "privileged" not only to acknowledge the school's hospitality but because Machiavelli's masterpiece is so seldom seen. Though Pope Leo X thought it worth while to build a theatre expressly to exhibit this play in, his successors have found its anti-clericalism less congenial. I came upon a small production of it in Florence in 1948, but three years later—on April Fools' Day—the Democ-Christian government stamped it *Non approvato*.

Mandragola seems not to have been translated into English till the *NR* drama critic published his version in 1927. So far as I know it has still not had a professional production in our language. What passed for its "first appearance on the English stage" (in 1939) was actually the appearance of another play under the same name. Machiavelli's salty dish had been changed by Ashley Dukes into one of those yellowish, nondescript desserts that they serve in English hotels. It was synthetic Sheridan—or perhaps a compound of Bowdler and some minor disciple of Pinero. Nahum Tate's sentimentalization of *Lear* is tact itself in comparison. There is one consolation: Duke's changes work out so badly that after reading him our love of Machiavelli's original is greatly increased: if Dukes is always wrong, Machiavelli is always right.

The action of the play consists simply of the accomplishing of adultery. How will our "hero" get into the (married) "heroine's" bed? The husband believes his wife to be sterile, but is persuaded she will become fertile if she partakes of the magic herb mandragola. Yet the first man she sleeps with after doing so will die. The husband must kidnap some lusty young fellow, thrust him into his wife's bed, and discard him. The truth of course is that the wife is not sterile, the herb is not magical, and the man is not "some lusty young fellow" but the same person who told the husband about mandragola and who is rewarded for his counsel by the present of a key to the married couple's house: namely, our hero. Not that he was clever enough to hatch the whole plot himself. His contribution is, not brains, but money, and he pays it out to three accomplices: an idea man to draft the plan of campaign and convince the husband, and a couple of moralists to win the cooperation of the wife. Who better for this last function than—her mother and her confessor? The cutting edge of Machiavelli's irony was never sharper than in the confessor's use of Catholic sophistry to justify adultery; Roman farce is transfigured to great drama by a fantastic intellect, an intellectual fantasy.

The crowning event of the plot is the crowning irony of the play: not merely that the hero arrives in the heroine's bed but that he is pushed into it by her husband, not merely that the heroine has a lover but that she has never seen him before he enters her bed, that she is fully reconciled to the situation and, after the first union, determined to perpetuate it. The limitations of modern gentility were never more manifest than in Ashley Dukes' inability to "take" Machiavelli's climax—and with it his view of his characters, his whole criticism of life. Dukes had hero and heroine meet and establish a romantic relationship *before* adultery took place.

It would not be worth harping on such misunderstandings except that they illustrate (if at an extreme) the kind of difficulty we have as moderns, and as non-Italians, with such a play, a difficulty worth overcoming not only because *Mandragola* is a masterpiece but also because it belongs to a school of drama that we do ill to forget. In what probably remains the best essay on Machiavelli in English, Macaulay said that "tragedy is corrupted by eloquence and comedy by wit" and that *Mandragola* is a prime instance of uncorrupted comedy—a comedy in which character is defined, not by clever or graceful talk, but by plot. In short Macaulay uses Machiavelli as a stick to beat Congreve and Sheridan with—today we might be tempted to beat Wilde and Giraudoux with it. Whether or not it is fair to describe these four as corrupt, it is certainly salutary to look back at the classic—and could we not say realistic?—comedy of the Italian Renaissance, at Calmo, at Ruzzante, and at Machiavelli.

Many of the things that Machiavelli does well, Molière, it is true, does better. One realized that Mr. Meisner's students had seen Barrault in *Scapin* and had learnt how so crude a thing as farce could be exploited by so subtle a poet as Molière; the "diabolical" rhythm of farce is a fine instrument for the "diabolical" mind of Machiavelli. What distinguishes Machiavelli from Molière is a certain fanaticism.

Sheer fanaticism, to be sure, would never yield comedy. We know from *The Prince* that Machiavelli pretends to be the polar opposite of a fanatic—a cynic. Yet (a) he is fanatical in his advocacy of cynicism and (b) his cynicism is contradicted, modified, or transformed by certain ideal allegiances, notably patriotism; and his patriotism is but part of a profound and revolutionary humanism.

More important than these *isms* is the spirit of Machiavelli. A clerical government, given a certain sophistication, might tolerate his cynicism and, given a certain liberalism, might tolerate his ideals; what it could never be happy with, unless it were positively stupid, is his restless and questing spirit. I should place him not with second-rate logicians but with first-rate poet-philosophers like Voltaire and Nietzsche—one might almost say like Swift. In the realm of pure thought, ambiguity may be simply a fault, the fault of indecision or inconsistency. In the realm of the imagination, ambiguities, though not good in themselves, may be put to work. In *Mandragola* they function as comic tensions. The complexity of Machiavelli's personality is in this play, even though under the control his genius, complexity takes the form of an unexampled simplicity.

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